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MAY 19 1999

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

May 19, 1999

JONATHAN E. CANIS

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Via Hand Delivery

Magalie R. Salas, Secretary  
Federal Communications Commission  
445 12<sup>th</sup> Street, S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20554

Re: Notice of *Ex Parte* Presentation by the Association for Local  
Telecommunications Services

In the Matter of:

Access Charge Reform

Petition of U S West Communications, Inc.  
For Forbearance from Regulation as a  
Dominant Carrier in the Phoenix, Arizona MSA

SBC Companies For Forbearance from  
Regulation as a Dominant Carrier for High  
Capacity Dedicated Transport Services in  
Specified MSAs

Petition of Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies  
For Forbearance from Regulation as a  
Dominant Carriers in Delaware; Maryland;  
Massachusetts; New Hampshire; New Jersey;  
New York; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island;  
Washington, D.C.; Vermont; and Virginia

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) Docket No. 96-262

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) Docket No. 98-157 /

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) Docket No. 98-227

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) Docket No. 99-24

KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP

Petition of Ameritech For Forbearance )  
from Dominant Carrier Regulation of its )  
Provision of High Capacity Service )  
Chicago LATA )

Docket No. 99-65

MAY 19 1999

Dear Ms. Salas:

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Pursuant to Sections 1.1206(b)(1) and (2) of the Commission's Rules, the Association for Local Telecommunication Services ("ALTS") submits this notice in the above-captioned docketed proceedings of an oral *ex parte* presentation made on May 17, 1999 to the following Commission Staff:


Yog R. Varma, Deputy Bureau Chief, Common Carrier Bureau  
Jane E. Jackson, Chief, Competitive Pricing Division  
Tamara Preiss, Competitive Pricing Division  
Edward B. Krachmer, Competitive Pricing Division  
Florence O. Setzer, Common Carrier Bureau  
Steven Spaeth, Competitive Pricing Division.

The presentation was made by Cronan O'Connell and Jonathan Askin of ALTS, Daniel Kelley of HAI Consulting and Jonathan Canis of Kelley Drye & Warren LLP (collectively, "the parties"). During the presentation, the parties discussed a variety of issues related to the Petitions for Forbearance from price regulation filed by a number of incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") in the above-captioned proceedings. Specifically, the parties argued that ILECs retain market power in relevant product markets that militates against deregulation of their services, including special access. During the presentation, the parties distributed written *ex parte* materials, a copy of which is appended to this filing.

KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP

Pursuant to the Commission's rules, ALTS submits an original and one (1) copy of this oral *ex parte* notification and attachment for inclusion in the public record of the above-referenced proceeding. Please direct any questions regarding this matter to the undersigned.

Respectfully submitted,



Jonathan E. Canis

Enclosure:

cc: Yog R. Varma, Deputy Bureau Chief, Common Carrier Bureau  
Jane E. Jackson, Chief, Competitive Pricing Division  
Tamara Preiss, Competitive Pricing Division  
Edward B. Krachmer, Competitive Pricing Division  
Florence O. Setzer, Common Carrier Bureau  
Steven Spaeth, Competitive Pricing Division  
International Transcription Service

# Deregulation of Dedicated Access Services: Timing Is Everything

Daniel Kelley  
HAI Consulting  
May 17, 1999

# Introduction

- ILECs have asked for Commission forbearance from special access regulation
  - How are the markets defined?
  - How much competition is there?
  - What conditions are necessary for forbearance?
  - What are the deregulation metrics?

# Market Definition

- Why define markets?
- What are the services?
- What is the service market?
- What is the geographic market?

# Why Define Markets?


- Markets are places where buyers and sellers come together to engage in trade
- If buyers have a sufficient number of satisfactory alternatives, competition can be relied upon to regulate the market
- Market definitions are necessary to evaluate the presence or absence of viable consumer alternatives

# What Are the Services?

- Special Access
  - Channel Termination
  - Multiplexing
  - Inter-office Transport
  - Entrance Facilities



# Special Access



# What Is the Service Market?

- Alternatives differ by special access rate element
  - Some customers have alternatives for the entire circuit
  - Some customers may have options only for inter-office transport and entrance facilities
- Competition must be evaluated for each element and for the service as a whole

# What is the Geographic Market?

- Geographic Dimension
  - Must define the market from end-user's perspective
  - Special access circuits are point-to-point
- Each potential point-to-point circuit is a market
- Is it possible to consider the geographic market more broadly: State, LATA, CBD?


# What is the Geographic Market?

- Statewide market?
  - Most end-users in a state do not have competitive alternatives
- LATA-wide?
  - Most end-users in a LATA do not have competitive alternatives
- CBD
  - Even within a major metropolitan area CBD, most end-users will lack alternatives

# Barriers to Entry and Substitutes

- Most buildings are not near CLEC fiber rings
  - Fiber ring expansion is costly and time consuming
- Even buildings near fiber rings may not be suitable for extension of facilities
  - High fixed cost
  - Building owner barriers
- UNEs/Collocation not working yet

# CLEC Presence



# Competitive Implications

- Forbearance would allow contract pricing without any floors or ceilings
  - End-users without competitive alternatives will be discriminated against
    - These end-users may experience significant price increases
  - Predatory behavior cannot be ruled out
    - CLEC investment will be chilled

# When Will Customer Specific Contracts be Justified?

- Minimum conditions
  - Entrance Facilities -- multiple collocation opportunities in carrier serving wire center
  - Transport -- collocation in high percentage (e.g., 90%) of end offices in LATA and actual competitive IO facilities
  - Channel Termination -- collocation and UNE provisions are working (evidence of significant use)
- All three conditions must be met



# Deregulation and Competition

- Use deregulation as a reward for opening market to competition
  - Cost effective and timely collocation
  - UNE availability at true TELRIC
    - Geographic unbundling
    - True forward-looking costs

# State Pricing Flexibility Plans

- The intrastate special access market is small
  - Little to gain and a lot to lose by abusing flexibility
- Interstate access is an effective substitute
  - High prices are unlikely
- Most state private line networks will have nodes that are not served by CLECs
  - Low prices are unnecessary
- Allegations of abuse despite these factors

# Comparative Risk Analysis

- Cost of premature deregulation?
  - Damage to competition during initial start-up phase
  - Delay the roll-out of competitive capacity
- Cost of delayed deregulation?
  - ILECS continue to grow
  - Profits are healthy (to say the least)
  - BOCs could cut prices today if they wanted to